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NOTES
THE WASHINGTON HOSPITAL CENTER
EXAMPLE: A HOSPITAL'S GUIDE TO
IMPLEMENTING THE RAPID ORGAN
RECOVERY PROGRAM
Karen Edelman Clarke*
PROLOGUE
On October 9, 1994, Theresa "Terri" Lynn Kiser was sitting in the
bed of a Ford Ranger truck between two friends holding a two-year-
old boy in her lap when the driver lost control. Terri curled her body
around the young boy just before the truck veered off the road, plow-
ing into a tree. Terri's friends and the two-year-old boy sustained mi-
nor injuries, but Terri did not fare as well. She was flown, uncon-
scious, to the Washington Hospital Center's MedSTAR trauma
center.
Upon arrival, Terri's prognosis was grim. Her parents quickly
learned that she was close to death. At the Washington Hospital Cen-
ter, a family advocate asked if they would consider Terri as an organ
donor. Terri's parents gave the doctors permission to take whatever
organs they needed from Terri. On October 10, 1994, at 11:05 a.m.,
Terri was pronounced dead.2
Doctors from Washington Hospital Center's Rapid Organ Recovery
* B.S., Radford University, 1995; J.D., The Catholic University of
America, Columbus School of Law, 1999. Special thanks to the family of
Terri Lynn Kiser for trusting life does not have to end at death. Thanks to
William 0. Ritchie, Ph.D., Director of Decedent Affairs, Washington Hospi-
tal Center for making this Note possible. Thanks to the editorial board for
their constant support and substantive suggestions throughout the evolution
of this Note.
1. See Brian Reilly, Giving the Gift of New Life, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 26,
1994, at 5.
2. See id.
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team had to work quickly. They had only thirty minutes from the time
Terri's heart stopped beating to preserve her kidneys for donation.3 If
they took too long, the kidneys would not be viable and two of the
nearly 800 District of Columbia residents desperately biding time on
the waiting list for donated kidneys would have to keep waiting.4
The Rapid Organ Recovery team used a new method of organ pres-
ervation with Terri. They made an incision in her leg, inserted a
catheter into her femoral artery, and flushed her abdominal cavity with
chilled preservation fluid?. By noon, one hour after Terri's death, the
doctors removed Terri's kidneys. The organs were recovered in a pre-
served state, chilled and "viable." Two people were taken off the or-
gan transplant waiting list and given a second chance at life when they
received Terri's kidneys.6 Terri was the first Rapid Organ Recovery
Donor at the Washington Hospital Center.7
INTRODUCTION
In 1996, the District of Columbia responded to residents' increasing
needs for viable organs suitable for transplant, particularly kidneys, 8
by enacting the Organ Preservation Amendment9 to the Anatomical
Gift Act.'0 The Amendment specifically allows a hospital to initiate
invasive organ preservation methods" prior to obtaining family con-
sent. This, in effect, buys hospitals more time to speak with family
members about organ donation and to obtain consent from the family
for an anatomical gift.
12
3. See id.
4. See Council of the District of Columbia, Report (Draft) on Bill 11-
317, the "District of Columbia Anatomical Gift Amendments Act of 1995,"
at 2 (1995).
5. See Reilly, supra note 1, at 5.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 4.
8. See Bruce R. Braun & Dane A. Drobny, Life, Death, and Organ Do-
nation, 24 J. SEC. LIT. 3 (1998); see also Reilly, supra note 1, at 2.
9. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1509.1 (1998).
10. Id. at § 2-1501 etseq. (1998).
11. See id. at §2-1509.1.
12. An anatomical gift can be organ, tissues, eyes, bones, arteries, blood,
other fluids, and any other parts of the human body. See id. at § 2-
Rapid Organ Recovery Program
The Organ Preservation Amendment validated Washington Hospital
Center's Rapid Organ Recovery Program (RORP). 13 The RORP began
in 199414 as a private response to District of Columbia residents'
transplant needs.' 5 The RORP procedure is designed to prolong the
time transplant teams have to gain the next of kin's consent for organ
donation. This extra time is important especially for the preservation
of kidneys.' 6 Because kidneys become unsuitable for transplantation
thirty minutes after death, 17 developing a program to increase the vi-
ability time of organs from non-heart-beating donors is extremely im-
portant.' 8 The RORP process mimics heart-beating circulation to ac-
complish this goal.' 9
The procedure begins at the time of death, certified by the trauma
(or intensive care) team. 20 The RORP team, which includes a trans-
10509.1(a). Further, "the hospital may use organ preservation equipment and
techniques, including ventilators and in situ flushing and cooling equipment,
to maintain the viability of the decedent's organs in order to preserve the op-
tion of family members and other authorized persons to consider donation."
Id.
13. See Council of the District of Columbia, supra note 4, at 2.
14. See Washington Hospital Center, Rapid Organ Recovery Program
(visited Nov. 3, 1998) <http://www.whc.mhg.edu/rapid-organ-recovery_
program/process.html>
15. See J.A. Light, et al., A Rapid Organ Recovery Program for Non-
Heart-Beating Donors, 29 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 3553 (1997).
16. See id.
17. See Council of the District of Columbia, supra, note 4 at 2; see also
Braun & Drobny, supra note 8, at 4.
18. See A.E. Kowalski, et al., A New Approach for Increasing the Organ
Supply, 10 CLIN. TRANSPLANTATION 653 (1996). A pivotal distinction is
made between non-heart-beating donors and brain-dead donors. Prior to the
development of the RORP process, organs were only recovered from brain-
dead, heart-beating donors. This was largely due to the fact that the dece-
dent's cardiovascular system continues to operate, thus keeping organs pre-
served, and viable, inside the decedent's body. See id. "If the heart stops
beating, the organs rapidly become unsuitable for transplantation, unless in
situ preservation can be initiated to slow the deterioration and/or organ re-
covery is rapidly carried out." Id. at 654.
19. See Light, supra note 15, at 3555.
20. See id. at 3553.
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plant surgeon, makes a small incision in the right groin to insert
catheters in the vascular system. 21 Two small incisions are made in
the abdomen to insert catheters in the peritoneal cavity. The catheters
are connected to a machine circulating preservation fluid22 for in situ
(inside the body) 23 organ preservation. 24 The preservation fluid is cir-
culated through the body cavity by closed-circuit refrigeration equip-
ment. This process is extraordinary in that in situ preservation may
be performed prior to gaining the consent of the next of kin.26
Thus far, only Virginia,27 Florida,28 and the District of Columbia29
have amended their Anatomical Gift Acts to allow for in situ preser-
vation of organs. 30 The District of Columbia's Washington Hospital
Center, however, is the only facility utilizing this legislation as a part
of its RORP.3'
Prior to the Organ Preservation Amendment's enactment, the
Washington Hospital Center used the RORP procedure under a proto-
col developed at the Consensus Conference on Trauma Victims and
Organ Donation (Consensus Conference). 32 The Consensus Confer-
21. See id.
22. See Kowalski, supra note 18, at 654. "[E]ach pair of kidneys [is]
placed on pulsatile preservation for 24 [hours] using Belzer's preservation
solution augmented with TFP (7)." Id.
23. See id. "The organs to be transplanted are maintained in working or-
der (in situ) by the body's own cardiovascular system until consent is ob-
tained. . . ." Id.
24. See Rick Weiss, Demand for Organs Fosters Aggressive Collection
Methods, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1997, at A16.
25. See Kowalski, supra note 18, at 653-54.
26. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1509.1 (1998); see also Washington Hos-
pital Center, The Rapid Organ Recovery Process, supra note 14.
27. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-295 (Michie 1996).
28. See FLA. STAT. ch. 732.917 (1998).
29. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1509.1 (1998).
30. See Braun & Drobny, supra note 8, at 4.
31. See id.; see also Craig S. Hunt, Organ Transplant Consent Debate
Endures, MONTGOMERY COUNTY J., Mar. 1, 1998, at AI; Rick Weiss, supra
note 24, at A1; Avis Thomas-Lester, A Helping Hand at the Hardest Moment,
WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1996, at B4.
32. See generally The Washington Hospital Center, Medlantic Research
Institute, & Washington Regional Transplant Consortium, Consensus Con-
Rapid Organ Recovery Program
ence consisted of transplant physicians, other health care profession-
als, organ recipients, government officials, attorneys, members of the
community, and clergy.33 These individuals came together specifically
to discuss RORP as an answer to the severe shortage of kidney donors
in the District of Columbia.
34
The Consensus Conference concluded a donor program like the
RORP could be successful in the District of Columbia without a leg-
islative amendment as long as: (1) a written protocol was developed
and implemented following their proposed guidelines, (2) the commu-
nity lent its active approval, and (3) the medical examiner determined
whether the recently deceased person was an appropriate candidate
35
for organ preservation (and later, recovery).36 In addition, the RORP
could be successful if Washington Hospital Center adhered to the
mandates of the Anatomical Gift Act 37 already enacted by the District
of Columbia.38
The Consensus Conference's proposed protocol contains the four
key elements. First, every admission to Washington Hospital Center's
MedSTAR Trauma Unit must receive appropriate lifesaving support
until the trauma team physicians make a determination and certifica-
tion of death.39 Second, upon such determination, notification of the
death must be directed to the District of Columbia Medical Examiner,
who has the sole authority to approve further action for the preserva-
tion and recovery of organs. 40 Third, if approved by the Medical Ex-
aminer, the transplant team will begin preserving the organ by in situ
ference on Trauma Victims and Organ Donation, Consensus Report, Oct. 7-
8, 1993 [hereinafter Consensus Report].
33. See id.
34. See id. at Executive Summary.
35. A strong factor in determining whether a given patient is an appro-
priate candidate for RORP is whether the RORP procedure would adversely
affect the ability of the Medical Examiner to determine cause and manner of
death. See id
36. See id.
37. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1501 et seq. (1998).
38. See id.
39. See Unif. Determination of Death Act § 1 (1998); see also Consensus
Report, supra note 32, at 7.
40. See Washington Hospital Center, The Rapid Organ Recovery Proc-
ess, supra note 14; see also Consensus Report, supra note 32 at 7.
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flushing. 4' The actions of the transplant team are governed by the
Anatomical Gift Act.42 Specifically, the physician that certifies the
death of the patient cannot participate on the transplant team in order
to eliminate ethical conflicts between the physician treating to save the
life of the patient, and the physician operating post-mortem. 43 Fourth,
counselors from the Family Advocacy Program 4 are called upon to
help the family accept the death of their loved one and to make a deci-
sion about organ donation.
The protocol recommended by the Consensus Conference is essen-
tially the same procedure followed by the Washington Hospital Center
today. 6 Washington Hospital Center's protocol allows the transplant
team to begin invasive techniques on the deceased for the purpose of
organ preservation prior to receiving consent from the next of kin.
47
Prior to enacting the Organ Preservation Amendment, the Consensus
Conference protocol, in effect, side-stepped the Anatomical Gift Act
by permitting invasive organ preservation procedures prior to receiv-
ing the consent from the decedent's next of kin.48 The RORP justified
its actions and authority by reference to an overwhelming kidney do-
nor shortage 49 and community approval.5 ° Washington Hospital Cen-
ter, as of today, however, will not initiate RORP preservation tech-
41. See Washington Hospital Center, The Rapid Organ Recovery Proc-
ess, supra note 14; see also Consensus Report, supra note 32, at 7.
42. See Consensus Report, supra note 32, at 7.
43. See id.; see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1507(b) (1998).
44. See Washington Hospital Center, Family Advocacy Program (1998).
45. See id.; see also Consensus Report, supra note 32, at 8.
46. See Washington Hospital Center, The Rapid Organ Recovery Proc-
ess, supra note 14; see also Consensus Report, supra note 32, at 7-8.
47. See Washington Hospital Center, The Rapid Organ Recovery Proc-
ess, supra note 14.
48. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1501 etseq. (1998).
49. See Braun & Drobny, supra note 8, at 73; see also Council of the
District of Columbia, supra note 4, at 2; Consensus Report, supra note 32, at
Executive Summary; Kowalski, supra note 18, at 653.
50. See Consensus Report, supra note 32, at 8; see also Kowalski, supra
note 18, at 656-57; Council of the District of Columbia, supra note 4, at 5;
J.A. Light, A.E. Kowalski & W.O. Ritchie et al., Developing a Rapid Organ
Recovery Program: An Innovative Solution to the Organ Donation Crisis, 10
UNOS UPDATE (Nov. 1994), at 6.
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niques prior to receiving the consent from the next of kin, despite the
fact that such allowances are built into the protocol. 5'
The RORP presents a novel problem in the analysis of the regula-
tion of organ donation. Essentially, the RORP will allow a hospital
trauma center to employ invasive surgical techniques after certifica-
tion of death, with or without a statute, and with or without the con-
sent of the next of kin.52 Such activities give rise to several common
law, statutory and constitutional questions examined in this Note.
Section I explores the origin of anatomical gift statutes and the subtle-
ties of the consent requirements adopted over time.
The constitutional questions will be addressed in Section II. This
Section argues that, first, the next of kin have historical rights in rela-
tion to the corpse, namely rights of possession, control, custody, and
to ensure a proper burial or other disposition of the remains. Second,
these historical rights vest in the next of kin at the time of death. Tra-
ditionally, courts called this historical right a "quasi-property" right.
The use of the term "quasi-property" does not mean to suggest it is
somehow property of a constitutional dimension. The term is used to
describe the rights the next of kin may claim to the body of their dece-
dent. This Note argues that quasi-property rights in no way rise to the
level of constitutional dimensions and do not grant the next of kin due
process guarantees that normally attach to property. The RORP does
not violate any due process rights the family may possess when the
transplant team invades the body cavity to preserve organs without the
next of kin's consent. This Section also argues that because the rights
of the next of kin to the decedent's body are not constitutional, a tak-
ing does not occur when the RORP team invades the body cavity of
the decedent pursuant to the regulatory Organ Preservation statute."
If an Organ Preservation statute is not in effect in the jurisdiction
where the RORP process is implemented, the invasion of the body
cavity may be evaluated as tort actions of mutilation and/or intentional
infliction of emotional distress inflicted against the next of kin. Sec-
51. See Telephone Interview with William 0. Ritchie, Jr., Ph.D., Direc-
tor of Decedent Affairs, Washington Hospital Center (Nov. 10, 1998).
52. See Washington Hospital Center, The Rapid Organ Recovery Proc-
ess, supra note 14; see also Light, supra note 15, at 3553; Braun & Drobny,
supra note 8, at 3-4; Kowalski, supra note 18, at 656; J.A. Light et al., supra
note 50, at 8.
53. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1509.1.
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tion III evaluates both of these tort actions. This Note posits that be-
cause the RORP procedure requires such a minimal invasion of the
body cavity, claims on these grounds will most likely fail to reach the
standard required by these tort actions.
This Note concludes that the RORP, whether utilized through a leg-
islative mechanism or private hospital program, does not violate the
constitutional rights of the next of kin when the process is imple-
mented without their consent. Further, the RORP process is benign in
nature and will not give rise to a successful tort action in mutilation or
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
I. FROM THE UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, AROUND THE
COUNTRY, AND BACK TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
A. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
In 1968, the legal community responded to the medical commu-
nity's rapid advances in transplant technology when the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) released
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1968 (1968 Act).54 All fifty
states and the District of Columbia enacted the 1968 Act within five
years." In 1987, the NCCUSL revised and amended the 1968 Act and
released the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1987 (1987 Act).5 6 The
1968 Act and the 1987 Act created protocols to govern the giving and
accepting of anatomical gifts.57 Specifically, they provided that the
donee58 may obtain anatomical gifts after obtaining the consent of the
54. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 1-6 (1968); see also Erik S. Jaffe, She's
Got Bette Davis['s] Eyes: Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver
Organs Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
528, 532 (1990).
55. See Unif. Anatomical Gift Act 1968 References & Annotations.
56. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 1-6 (1987).
57. See e.g., Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 1-6 (1968); see also Unif.
Anatomical Gift Act § 1-6 (1987).
58. See Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 3 (1968); see also Unif. Anatomical
Gift Act § 6(a) (1987).
(a) The following persons may become donees of ana-
tomical gifts for the purposes stated:
(1) a hospital, physician, surgeon, or procurement
organization, For transplantation, therapy, medical or
dental education, research, or advancement of medical or
Rapid Organ Recovery Program
listed parties able to be donors.59 The NCCUSL released the 1968 Act
to encourage an increase in the current supply of viable, transplantable
donated organs. 60 In practice, however, the consent requirement of the
1968 Act was a barrier to obtaining viable, transplantable organs.6'
The 1987 Act amends the 1968 Act by allowing the coroner or
medical examiner (M.E.) to remove parts of a body for transplantation
without first obtaining consent.62 This can be done so long as: (1)
there is a request from a donee for the organ; (2) the M.E. weighs the
donee's need for the specified organ; (3) the M.E. makes a reasonable
effort to contact those able to make the anatomical donation; (4) there
is no refusal on the part of the decedent or those able to make the
anatomical donation; (5) the removal of the part is performed by a
physician, surgeon, or technician; (6) an autopsy or investigation is
not hindered by the removal; (7) the recovery is performed according
to accepted protocol; and (8) the M.E. ensures that cosmetic restora-
tion will be performed if necessary.63 This new provision recognizes
that the requirements of consent are a barrier to receipt of organs from
possible donors. 64
dental science;(2) an accredited medical or dental school, college,
or university for education, research, advancement of
medical or dental science; or(3) a designated individual for transplantation or
therapy needed by that individual.
Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 6(a).
59. See Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 2 (1968); see also Unif. Anatomical
Gift Act § 2-3 (1987).
(a) "An individual . . . who is at least [18] years of age may ...
make an anatomical gift. . . ." Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 2-3 (1987).
60. See Jaffe, supra note 54, at 535; see also Jesse Dukeminier, Supply-
ing Organs for Transplantation, 68 MICH. L. REV. 811, 814-15 (1990).
61. See Dukeminier, supra note 60, at 825-31.
62. See Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 4(a) (1987).
63. See id.
64. See id.
The Task Force on Organ Transplantation reported that
the number of potential-donors annually is much smaller
than the estimated one million deaths that occur each year
in hospitals in the United States . . . "Given the available
estimates of the size of the donor pool, the current system
for procuring organs yields somewhere between nine and
twenty percent of the possible pool of donors for various
types of organs and tissues."
2000]
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B. Around the Country
There are two types of statutes that attempt to remedy the "consent
as a barrier" problem triggered when a body is in the custody of the
M.E. The first type is a statute such as the 1987 Act, which requires an
M.E. to exercise a reasonable effort to obtain consent to an anatomical
gift from the next of kin. 65 The second type is a statute that presumes
consent to an anatomical gift when the body is in the custody of the
M.E.6
Id. at Comment.
65. States falling into the reasonable effort category include: Arizona,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-844(A)(2) (1998); California, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7515.5(a)(2) (1998); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 327-
4(a)(2) (1998); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 39-3405(l)(b) (1998); Indiana, IND.
CODE § 29-2-16-4.5(a)(2) (1998); Iowa, IOWA CODE 142C.4A(1)(b ) (1998);
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.9213(a)(2) (West 1998); Montana,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-17-215(1)(b) (1998); New Hampshire, N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 291-A:5(I)(b) (1998); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-
6A-4(A)(2) (1998); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.2-04(l)(b)
(1998); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 97.956(l)(c) (1998); Pennsylvania, 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8641(a)(2) (1998); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-
18.6-4(a)(2) (1998); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-30-204(3) (1998);
Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-28-5(l)(b) (1998); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 157.06(4)(a)(2) (1998).
66. See, e.g., Colorado's statute designed to negate the need for reason-
able effort.
(1) Whenever a post-mortem examination is performed
pursuant to section 30-10-606(2), the examining physi-
cian may remove the pituitary gland from the body of the
deceased for the purpose of medical research, education,or theray if(a) Tyi removal is performed in conjunction with a
post-mortem examination performed under the jurisdic-
tion of the county coroner;(b) The removal will not impede or interfere with the
investigation which gave rise to the post-mortem exami-
nation and will not significantly alter post-mortem ap-
pearance;(c) No prior objection by the decedent is made known
or no objection by the decedent's next of kin is expressed
at the time of the post-mortem examination and the dece-
dent was not a known member of a religious group with a
public position in opposition to tissue removal.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-10-621(1) (1998).
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Presumed consent statutes generally target a specified body part,
such as the pituitary gland or the cornea.67 The M.E. may then remove
only the specified body part(s) if four criteria are met:
(1) a request for such tissue for the purposes of trans-
plant or therapy is made by an authorized recipient; (2)
the removal would not interfere with the course of an
autopsy or other investigation; (3) the removal would
not alter the deceased's facial appearance; and (4) no
objection by the deceased or the next of kin is known
by the [M.E.].6s
C. The District of Columbia
The District of Columbia enacted the 1968 Act69 in 1970.70 In addi-
tion, the District of Columbia enacted an Anatomical Gift statute pro-
viding for the non-consensual removal of the cornea, aortic heart
valve, and the pulmonary heart valve.7' When a body is in the custody
of the Chief Medial Examiner of the District of Columbia,72 he or she
may authorize the removal of these parts.73 Despite the enactment of
67. See generally Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-10-621 (West
1998); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732-9185 (West 1998); Kentucky, KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.187 (Michie 1998); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN. EST.
& TRUSTS § 4-509.1 (1998); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
333.10202 (West 1998); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 390.36 (West
1998); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-61-71 (1998); Nebraska, NEB.
REV. ST. § 71-4813 (1998); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 291-
A:7-b (1998); New York, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4222 (McKinney 1998);
Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.60 (Anderson 1998); Oklahoma, OKL.
STAT. ANN. TIT. 63 § 944.1 (West 1998); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §
68-30-204 (1998) & TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-30-301 (1998); Washington,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 68.50.630 (West 1998); West Virginia, W. VA.
CODE § 16-19-3a (1998).
68. Jaffe, supra note 54, at 535.
69. See Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § I et seq.
70. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1501 et seq. (1998), Notes, References and
Annotations.
71. See D.C. CODEANN. § 2-1605 (1998).
72. See Telephone Interview with William 0. Ritchie, Jr., Ph.D., Direc-
tor, Office of Decedent Affairs, Washington Hospital Center (Nov. 10, 1998).
73. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1605 (1998). However, the current Chief
20001
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these statutes, the District of Columbia continued to suffer from a se-
vere shortage of transplantable organs.74
On May 24, 1996, the District of Columbia passed the Organ Pres-
ervation amendment to the existing Anatomical Gift Act75 to "address
the current shortage of organs that are acceptable for transplantation
while respecting the wishes of the potential donor's family. ' 76 This
amendment follows the more recent trend toward presumed consent
anatomical gift statutes77 by allowing the hospital to begin invasive
organ preservation techniques prior to gaining family consent to an
anatomical gift. 78 The Organ Preservation amendment provides that
Medical Examiner of the District of Columbia, Dr. Joye M. Carter, "bars the
removal of corneas and heart valves at the morgue. . . ." Frank J. Murray,
Doctor Controls Access to D.C. Body Parts, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1995, at
A6.
74. See Braun & Drobny, supra note 8, at 73; see also Council of the
District of Columbia, supra note 4, at 2.
75. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1509.1 (1998).
76. See Council of the District of Columbia, supra note 4, at 2.
77. See generally Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-10-621
(1998); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732-9185 (1998); Kentucky, KY. REV.
STAT. § 311.187 (1998); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS § 4-
509.1 (1998); Michigan, MICH. CODE L. ANN. § 333.10202 (1998); Minne-
sota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 390.36 (1998); Mississippi, MISS. CODE § 41-61-
71 (1998); Nebraska, NEB. REV. ST. § 71-4813 (1998); New Hampshire,
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 291-A:7-b (1998); New York, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 4222 (McKinney 1998); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE § 2108.60 (1998);
Oklahoma, 63 OKL. STAT. ANN. § 944.1 (1998); Tennessee, TENN. CODE
ANN. § 68-30-204 (1998) & TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-30-301 (1998); Wash-
ington, WA. STAT. 68.50.630 (1998); West Virginia, W. VA. STAT. § 16-19-
3a (1998).
78. The Organ Preservation statute states in pertinent part:
(a) In the event a person authorized by § 2-1502(b) to
consent to an anatomical gift of all or part of the dece-
dent's body is not immediately available for a representa-
tive of a hospital to make the request required by § 2-
1509, the hospital may use organ preservation equipment
and techniques, including ventilators and in situ flushing
and cooling equipment, to maintain the viability of the
decedent's organs in order to preserve the option of fam-
ily members and other authorized person to consider do-
nation.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1509.1 (1998).
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when the next of kin is not available to consent to an anatomical gift,
"the hospital may use organ preservation equipment and techniques
including ventilators and in situ flushing and cooling equipment, to
maintain the viability of the decedent's organs in order to preserve the
option of [next of kin] ... to consider donation." 79
There is a significant difference between the District of Columbia's
presumed consent statute allowing for the removal of the cornea, aor-
tic heart valve, and the pulmonary heart valve,80 and the presumed
consent statute allowing for the preservation of organs after death.8,
The difference lies in the custody and control of the deceased. Stat-
utes that allow for the removal of corneal tissue specifically call for
the deceased to be in the physical and legal custody of the M.E."2 The
new organ preservation statute has no such requirement. The new
amendment allows hospitals to begin organ preservation techniques
while the decedent is in their custody. 83 Washington Hospital Center's
RORP protocol requires notification to, and approval of, the Office of
the Medical Examiner, before preservation techniques can be used. 4
The Washington Hospital Center recognizes that whenever a person
dies, the body is legally in the custody of the M.E., though not physi-
cally, until the Office of the Medical Examiner can certify the cause of
death.8 5
II. HANDS OFF! THAT'S MY QUASI-PROPERTY: NEXT OF
KIN'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THE CORPSE OF THEIR
DECEDENT
In order for a person to be protected by the United States Constitu-
79. Id.
80. See id. at § 2-1605.
81. Seeid.at§2-1509.1.
82. See id. at § 1605(b). "The Chief Medical Examiner of the District of
Columbia may allow tissue to be removed from any dead human body in his
or her custody or under his or her jurisdiction ... ." Id.
83. See id. at § 2-1509.1.
84. See Washington Hospital Center, The Rapid Organ Recovery Proc-
ess, supra note 14; see also, Consensus Report, supra note 32, at 7.
85. See Telephone Interview with William 0. Ritchie, Jr., Ph.D., Direc-
tor of Decedent Affairs, Washington Hospital Center (Nov. 16, 1998); see
also, D.C. CODE § 11-2304 (1998).
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tion, the person must be alive. Constitutional protections turn on the
definition of "person." Life is a bare minimum for personhood, there-
fore the "person" ceases to exist at death. If there is no "person," the
Constitution will no longer apply.86 The Constitution, however, does
protect the interests of living persons with claims regarding the de-
ceased. The rights existing after death, whatever the state declares
them to be, belong to the next of kin.87
Common law principles recognize that the next of kin has no com-
mercial or material property right to the body of their decedent. 88 Yet,
many courts recognize his or her next of kin's "quasi-property rights"
in the body, stemming from their obligation to bury the decedent.89
86. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
87. See id.
88. See Culpepper v. Pearl Street Building, Inc., 877 P.2d 877 (Colo.
1994).
It is universally recognized that there is no property in a
dead body in a commercial or material sense. "[I]t is not
part of the assets of the estate (though disposition may be
affected by the provision of the will); it is not subject to
replevin; it is not property in a sense that will support dis-
covery proceedings; it may not be held as security for fu-
neral costs- it cannot be withheld by an express company,
or retumed to the sender, where shipped under a contract
calling for cash on delivery; it may not be the subject of a
gift causa mortis; it is not common law larceny to steal a
corpse. Rights in a dead body exist ordinarily only for
purposes of burial and, except with statutory authoriza-
tion, for no other purpose."
Id. (citation omitted); see also Daugherty v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit and
Trust Co., 387 A.2d 244, 246 n.2 (Md. 1978) (citing Snyder v. Holy Cross
Hosp., 352 A.2d 334, 340 (quoting, P.E. JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS
AND OF BURIAL AND BURIAL PLACES, 2nd ed. 1950)).
89. See generally Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1984);
O'Donnel v. Slack, 55 P. 906 (Cal. 1899); McCoy v. Georgia Baptist Hosp.,
306 S.E.2d 746 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983); Orr v. Dayton & ,M. Traction Co., 96
N.E. 462 (Ind. 1911); Anderson v. Acheson, 110 N.W. 335 (Iowa 1907);
Seaton v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W. 871 (Ky. Ct. App. 1912); Radomer
Russ-Pol Unterstitzung Verein v. Posner, 4 A.2d 743 (Md. 1939); Burney v.
Children's Hosp. in Boston, 47 N.E. 401 (Mass. 1897); Doxtator v. Chicago
& W. M. R. Co., 79 N.W. 922 (Mich. 1899); Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238
(Minn. 1891); Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 507 A.2d 718
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986); Barela v. Frank A. Hubbel Co., 355 P.2d
133 (N.M. 1960); Parker v. Quinn-McGowen Co., 138 S.E.2d 214 (N.C.
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Prior to this recognition, the next of kin did not have standing to en-
force an action if the decedent was not decently buried. 90
Due to the nature of this quasi-property right, the right vests in the
next of kin at the time of death.9' "Furthermore, the survivor has the
legal right to bury the body in the condition it was in when life
[ended]. 92 When a third party interferes with these rights, the remedy
lies not in the damages done to the decedent's body, but "to the next
of kin by infringement of his right to have the body delivered to him
for burial without mutilation., 93 Determining in whom these quasi-
rights vest is somewhat hierarchical, beginning with the surviving
spouse.94 If there is no spouse, then the rights vest with those closest
1964); Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878 (Pa. 1904); Sullivan v. Catholic
Cemeteries, Inc., 317 A.2d 430 (R.I. 1974); Simpkins v. Lumbermens Mut.
Casualty Co., 20 S.E.2d 733 (S.C. 1942); Terrill v. Harbin, 376 S.W.2d 945
(Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Sanford v. Ware, 60 S.E.2d 10 (Va. 1950); England v.
Central Pocahontas Coal Co., 104 S.E. 46 (W.Va. 1920); Koerber v. Patek,
102 N.W. 40 (Wis. 1905) [hereinafter Quasi-Property Rights Cases]. The use
of the phrase "quasi-property" is not to indicate an automatic constitutional
right as if it were property. The terminology is used as a convenience.
90. See Osteen v. Southern R. Co., 86 S.E. 30 (S.C. 1915).
This court will not commit itself to such a barbarous and
savage doctrine as to hold that, when a person dies, no
one has such a property interest in the body as to see the
body as decently interred, and resting place uninterfered
with; and a relative or friend has a right to see that the
body is protected, and these feelings in relation thereto
protected.
Id. at 31.
91. See Quasi-Property Rights Cases, supra note 89.
92. Parker v. Quinn-McGowen Co., 138 S.E.2d 214, 216 (N.C. 1964)
(citing Kyles v. Southern R.R., 61 S.E. 278 (N.C. 1938)). This is also true
with rights such as inheritance rights. Note that inheritance rights are not re-
ferred to as "quasi-property," therefore the use of this term is misleading and
merely for convenience of the court.
93. Deeg v. City of Detroit, 76 N.W.2d 16 (Mich. 1956); see also Lar-
son v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238 (Minn. 1891).
94. See Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 105 So. 161 (Fla.
1925), cert. denied 105 So. 168 (Fla. 1925); Enos v. Snyder, 63 P. 170 (Cal.
1900); Boyle v. Chandler, 138 A. 273 (1927); Dunahoo v. Bess, 200 So. 541
(Fla. 1941); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Wilson, 51 S.E. 24 (1905); Anderson v.
Acheson, 110 N.W. 335 (1907); Haney v. Stamper, 125 S.W.2d 761 (1939);
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in relation to the decedent, such as, children of proper age, parents, or
siblings until the closest relation is located.95
Anatomical gift statutes have followed the common law approach
by recognizing the next of kin has an interest in the family member's
corpse. The 1968 Act, 1987 Act, and subsequent state legislation rec-
ognize the requirement that the next of kin must give consent to an
anatomical gift.
96
A. Looking at the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution97 provide that a person shall not be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
98
This guarantee only applies to the actions of government officials or
state actors when they seek to deprive a person of life, liberty, or
property.99 State actors include government officials and their agents
acting under the color of state law. 00 The nature of due process pro-
tections can be divided among two major areas: procedural due proc-
Bunol v. Bunol, 127 So. 70 (1930); Pulsifer v. Douglass, 48 A. 118 (1901);
Messina v. La Rosa, 150 N.E.2d 5 (Mass. 1958); Sacred Heart of Jesus Pol-
ish Nat. Catholic Church v. Soklowski, 199 N.W. 81 (Minn. 1924); Holland
v. Metalious, 198 A.2d 654 (N.H. 1964); Parker v. Quinn-McGowen Co., 138
S.E.2d 214 (N.C. 1964); McClellan v. Filson, 5 N.E. 861 (Ohio 1886); Har-
din v. Ehring (Madison Co.), 155 N.E. 153 (Ohio Ct. App. 1926); Leschey v.
Leschey, 97 A.2d 784 (Penn. 1953); Sullivan v. Catholic Cemeteries, Inc.,
317 A.2d 430 (R.I. 1974); Simpkins v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 20
S.E.2d 733 (1942); Samsel v. Diaz, 659 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983);
Flores v. DeGalvan, 127 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Ct. App. 1939); Nichols v. Cen-
tral V.R. Co., 109 A. 905 (Vt. 1919); Koerber v. Patek, 102 N.W. 40 (1905).
95. See Sullivan v. Catholic Cemeteries, Inc., 317 A.2d 430 (R.I. 1974).
96. See Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 3(a) (1987); see also Unif. Ana-
tomical Gift Act § 2 (1968).
97. For purposes of this Note, the analysis of due process protections in
terms of property deprivation will be treated as if they are the same under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
98. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
99. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
100. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1998).
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ess and substantive due process, though procedural due process analy-
sis is more relevant to organ donation statutes.
1. Procedural Due Process
When the government seeks to deprive an individual of life, liberty,
or property, a procedure to effectuate deprivation should be employed.
The "[g]overnment must have made an individualized determination
about a particular individual, and that individualized determination
must impose a burden on or deny a benefit to that individual in a way
which infringes that individual's liberty or property (or life)
interests."' 0 ' Such a determination may only be made through some
type of procedure affording the individual notice of the proceeding
and a2n opportunity to be heard on the merits of the claim.'
0 2
Procedural due process 0 3 rights are especially important in the case
of an anatomical gift. If the gift is made without the next of kin's con-
sent, the only realistic remedy is a monetary award. The nature of an
anatomical gift is an overriding concern for the court in evaluating
whether making an anatomical gift complies with the procedural due
process test. Such concerns will give rise to court scrutiny in the areas
of notice to the next of kin and consent requirements.
2. Substantive Due Process
Recent Supreme Court cases have focused their substantive due
process analysis on finding personal, "fundamental" privacy rights
protections in the due process clause. 10 4 It is difficult to analyze where
the Supreme Court falls today on the subject of substantive due proc-
101. WILLIAM A. KAPLIN, THE CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 143 (1992).
102. See id.
103. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), set the standard to deter-
mine how much process is due by performing a three step balancing test.
The court must balance "the private interest that will be affected by the offi-
cial action; ... the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used. . . and; ...the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the addi-
tional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Id; see also Jaffe,
supra note 54, at 562.
104. See e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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ess and fundamental rights. For purposes of this Note, be aware that
privacy rights exist by application of the due process clause and that
only the rights that are found to be "fundamental" are included in a
guarantee of the right to personal privacy. 0 5
B. Recent Case Law Regarding the Quasi-Property Interest
If the next of kin possess a quasi-property right at the time of the
decedent's death, certain due process rights may attach. Recently, in-
dividuals have attacked the constitutional validity of presumed consent
statutes 0 6 on the grounds of violations of procedural and substantive
due process.'0 7
1. Attacking Presumed Consent Statutes on Procedural Due Process
Grounds
In Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant,10 8 a mother sued a hos-
pital for removing the corneal tissue of her child who died of sudden
infant death syndrome. 0 9 The removal was pursuant to a Georgia
statute.110 The law allows for the removal, so long as the decedent is
in the custody of the M.E. and, inter alia, the decedent does not object
to such a procedure during his or her life."' The hospital knew of no
105. See e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
106. See e.g., State v. Powell, 497 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 1986); Georgia Lions
Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985); Tillman v. Detroit Re-
ceiving Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 275 (Mich. 1984); Mansaw v. Midwest Organ
Bank, 1998 WL 386327 (W.D.Mo. 1998); Perry v. Saint Francis Hosp. and
Medical Ctr., Ihc., 886 F. Supp. 1551 (D. Kansas 1995); Brotherton, et al. v.
Cleveland, et al., 733 F. Supp. 56 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
107. See e.g., State v. Powell, 497 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 1986); Georgia Lions
Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985); Tillman v. Detroit Re-
ceiving Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 275 (Mich. 1984); Mansaw v. Midwest Organ
Bank, 1998 WL 386327 (W.D. Mo. 1998); Perry v. Saint Francis Hosp. and
Medical Ctr., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1551 (D. Kansas 1995); Brotherton, et al. v.
Cleveland, et al., 733 F. Supp. 56 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
108. 335 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985).
109. See id.
110. See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-23-6(b)(1) (1996).
111. See id. which states in pertinent part:
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objections made by the decedent during life since the decedent was an
infant, however, Lavant argued that the corneal tissue was wrongly
removed because she received no notice that the procedure would be
performed."
l 2
The lower court agreed with Lavant holding the removal of corneal
tissue after death, without notice and an opportunity to object, de-
prives the next of kin of a quasi-property right in the corpse of the de-
cedent."3 The Supreme Court of Georgia agreed with the lower court,
holding "the courts have evolved the concept of quasi property in rec-
ognition of the interests of surviving relatives in the possession and
control of the decedents' bodies."'" 4 The court then went on to over-
turn the lower court by stating that such a creation of the courts does
not rise to the level of constitutional dimension."
5
The Lavant court stopped short of declaring that the next of kin's
interest in this common law right could not be protected. But because
the court refused to recognize a due process right in the next of kin's
interest, in the decedent, the state and its courts could continue to de-
fine the nature of the interests. In this case, the state defined its inter-
est in a decedent to include authority to remove corneal tissue without
the consent of the next of kin.
(b)(1) Upon a request from an authorized official of an
approved eye bank for corneal tissue to be used for trans-
plants or research, a coroner, a medical examiner, hospi-
tal, funeral director, or an authorized official acting lor
the coroner may permit the removal of the corneal tissue
of a decedent by individuals designated by the eye bank
for delivery to the eye bank for such purposes if ali of the
following conditions are met:(A) the decedent from whom the tissue is to be taken is
under the jurisdiction of a coroner or medical examiner
p'ursuant to Code Section 45-16-27;
B) no objection by the decedent during his lifetime or,
after his death, by the appropriate person listed in para-
graph (2) of this subsection is known to the coroner,
medical examiner, or authorized official acting for the
coroner at the time the tissue is removed; and(C) the person designated by the eye bank to remove the
tissue is a person authorized to do so under Code Section
31-23-5.
Id.
112. See Georgia Lions Eye Bank, 335 S.E.2d at 128.
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. See id.
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2. Attacking Presumed Consent Statutes on Substantive Due Process
Grounds
In Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hospital,1 6 the decedent's mother
brought an action against the hospital for removing her daughter's
eyes without consent in violation of state law. 1 7 Mrs. Tillman argued
that because she was the next of kin to the decedent, she "ha[d] an in-
herent, fundamental right to bury her decedent's body without mutila-
tion."'
l18
Michigan common law recognizes that the next of kin have a cause
of action in tort for the interference with their right to the "possession,
control, or burial" of their decedent. 19 The Tillman court, however,
found this right did not rise to the level of constitutional
dimensions. 20 The court did not agree that a quasi-property right was
in fact a due process property right with all of the constitutional pro-
tections that followed. The Tillman court clarified that the use of the
term "quasi-property" does not mean that the court intended for the
interest to be a property interest. Further, because the court found no
procedural due process right, there was no constitutional tort. The
court further stated that the fundamental privacy right applies only to a
person's right to make decisions about his or her own body12 ' and that
right dies when the person dies.1
22
The Florida Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in State v.
Powell,123 where the families of two young boys sued for damages as a
result of the wrongful removal of their sons' corneal tissue. 24 The
families claimed, among other things, that the statute allowing the M.
E. to remove corneal tissue without consent violated the fundamental
due process right of families to make personal choices and decisions
116. 360 N.W.2d 275 (Mich. 1984).
117. See id at 276-77.
118. Id. at277.
119. Id. (citing Deeg v. Detroit, 76 N.W.2d 16 (Mich. 1956)).
120. See id
121. See id
122. See Tillman, 360 N.W.2d at 277 (citing Hubenschmidt v. Shears,
270 N.W.2d 2 (Mich. 1978) and McLean v. Rogers, 300 N.W.2d 389 (Mich.
1980)).
123. 497 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 1986).
124. See id at 190.
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affecting the family.' 25 This argument proved to be unsuccessful since
substantive due process rights are directed at the living person and
pertain to liberty of the person. The next of kin are the living persons
to which the substantive due process rights are directed, not the dece-
dent. To argue for family substantive due process rights, where the
family member in question is no longer recognized as possessing these
rights, is unfounded.
The Powell court stated the right to personal freedom of choice ex-
ists between family members now living. 26 It held the next of kin may
not bring a tort action for interference with their right to effect a
proper burial because it does not rise to the level of constitutional
protections. 27 The court ruled the family is free to pursue other tort
remedies, such as mutilation, which would require proof that the dece-
dent's body was so affected by an intrusion that the body is unfit for
burial.
28
C. The District of Columbia Organ Preservation Amendment
and Due Process
The Organ Preservation Amendment to the Anatomical Gift Act in
the District of Columbia' 29 is similar to the presumed consent statute
that allows the Chief M.E. to remove the cornea, aortic heart valve,
and pulmonary heart valve without the consent of the next of kin.3°
The statute allows the intrusive techniques to be performed on the de-
ceased for purposes of organ donation. There are, however, two nota-
ble differences between the statutes. First, the Organ Preservation
Amendment does not allow the actual removal or mutilation of any
part of the deceased; the allowed intrusion is exclusively for the pres-
ervation of organs, pending consent by the next of kin for recovery of
organs.'3' The intrusion is carefully calculated to buy the hospital
more time to gain consent from the next of kin.
132
125. See id at 1193.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See infra part III.A.
129. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1509 (1998).
130. See id. at § 2-1605.
131. See id. at § 2-1509.1.
132. See id. at § 2-1509.1(a) which states in pertinent part, "the hospital
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Second, the Organ Preservation Amendment does not presume the
M.E. has custody of the decedent's body prior to beginning the inva-
sive preservation techniques. 33 Howeyer, the RORP targets non-heart-
beating donors that die of traumatic injuries.3 As long as RORP do-
nors consist of this group of individuals, it is arguable the decedent,
when donating under this program, is in the legal custody of the
M.E. 35 This is because the Chief M.E. is required by statute to inves-
tigate, violent deaths, 136 sudden deaths where the cause is not readily
ascertainable, 137 deaths that occur under suspicious circumstances, 138
and deaths that result from a disease suspected to be a threat to public
health. 39
Currently, District of Columbia law, like many other jurisdictions,
recognizes the rights of the next of kin to "possess, preserve and bury,
or otherwise to dispose of, a dead body.' 140 Existing case law recog-
nizing this right recognizes remedies only in tort.'4 ' This recognition is
aligned with the decisions of neighboring jurisdictions discussed
above 142 by refusing to recognize a constitutional property right in the
next of kin.
Although the neighboring jurisdictions evaluated in this Note ana-
lyzed only presumed consent laws, there are similarities between pre-
sumed consent anatomical gift laws and the Organ Preservation
amendment. An analysis of the procedure utilized to preserve organs
for transplantation under the presumed consent statute versus proce-
may use organ preservation equipment and techniques, including ventilators
and in situ flushing and cooling equipment, to maintain the viability of the
decedent's organs in order to preserve the option of family members and
other authorized persons to consider donation." Id.
133. Cf, D.C. CODEANN. §§ 2-1509.1, 2-1605.
134. See Light, supra note 15, at 3553.
135. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-2304 (1998).
136. See id. § 11-2304(a)(1).
137. See id. § 11-2304(a)(2).
138. See id. § 11-2304(a)(3).
139. See id. § 11-2304(a)(6).
140. Steagall et al. v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., et al., 171 F.2d 352, 353
(D.C. Cir. 1948). See also, e.g., Quasi-Property Rights Cases, supra note 89.
141. See Steagall, 171 F.2d at 353.
142. See Powell, 497 So.2d at 1188; see also Georgia Lions Eye Bank,
Inc., 335 S.E.2d at 127; Tillman, 360 N.W.2d at 275.
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dures used under the Organ Preservation Amendment showed that the
procedure to preserve organs is much more benign than the procedures
permitted by the presumed consent statutes) 43
The presumed consent statute in the District of Columbia allows the
Chief M.E. to remove the aortic and pulmonary heart valves.144 To ef-
fectuate the removal of these organs, the chest must be surgically
cracked and opened, similar to heart surgery. 4 5 In comparison, during
the procedure utilized by the RORP, 146 small incisions are made and
catheters are inserted into the arteries carrying chilled preservation
fluid through the abdominal cavity, proving to be much less
invasive.
147
The differences between the two procedures are drastic in both de-
scription and practice. Yet, presumed consent statutes have been up-
held as not violating the due process rights of the next of kin.'4' The
Organ Preservation amendment allows a procedure which is much
more benign and nothing is removed from the body.
The current trend of case law decisions on the issue of quasi-
property rights under presumed consent statutes compared to the be-
nign intrusion allowed by the Organ Preservation Amendment leads to
one probable conclusion. A District of Columbia court considering an
action arising from the Washington Hospital Center's use of the RORP
would most likely determine that the right of the next of kin in over-
seeing a proper burial is not a constitutionally protected property right.
The next of kin likely will not be entitled to procedural or substantive
due process protections when the coroner or M.E. is acting within his
or her statutory prescription. Hence, there would be no need to analyze
the removal of statutorily prescribed organs as a taking under the Con-
stitution. It would also be unnecessary to answer whether, when
143. Evaluations of each procedure will become increasingly relevant to
arguments made by the next of kin. Because family members will not have
avenues of remedies in constitutional tort, they will be forced to pursue tort
actions alleging mutilation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
144. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1605 (1998).
145. See Murray, supra note 73, at A6.
146. See Washington Hospital Center, Rapid Organ Recovery Program,
supra note 14.
147. See Weiss, supra note 24, at A16.
148. See Powell, 497 So.2d at 1188; Georgia Lions Eye Bank, 335 S.E.2d
at 127; Tillman, 360 N.W.2d at 275.
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Washington Hospital Center uses its Rapid Organ Recovery Program,
it is an agent of the M.E. acting under the color of state law.
III. REMEDIES IN TORT
A. The Tort of Mutilation
As long as the procedure under the RORP does not rise to the level
of a constitutional tort, the next of kin must pursue another avenue of
recovery - the tort of mutilation. 49 This is good news for Organ Pro-
curement consortia, hospitals, and organ donation advocates. The tort
of mutilation places a much higher burden on'the next of kin in terms
of proving how the medical procedure rises to the level of
mutilation.150 Where a violation of due process rights requires a mere
showing of the state's failure to abide by basic procedural or funda-
mental constitutional safeguards, 15' the tort of mutilation requires
proof that the decedent's body was so affected by an intrusion that it
is unfit for burial.
52
Many jurisdictions recognize the tort of mutilation where one will-
fully, recklessly, wantonly, unlawfully, or negligently defaces the
body of a dead person. 3 Mutilation of a dead body occurs when one
effects a disturbance upon the body so as to render it unfit for pur-
poses of burial. 154 Many cases that address the tort of mutilation have
a factual basis of wrongful autopsy, 55 negligent handling of'the
149. See e.g., Steagall, 171 F.2d at 353.
150. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (1996).
151. See U.S. CONST. amend.- V, XIV, § 1; see also Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1998).
152. See Farley v. Carson, 8 Ohio Dec. Rep. 119.
153. See Plamquist v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 358 (S.D. Cal.
1933); see also Streipe v. Liberty Mut. Life Ins. Co., 47 S.W.2d 1004 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1932); Burney v. Children's Hosp. in Boston, 47 N.E. 401 (Mass.
1897); Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238; Finley v. Atlantic Transport Co., 115
N.E. 715 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1917); Parker v. Quinn-McGowen Co., 138 S.E.2d
214 (N.C. 1964); Love v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 121 S.W.2d 986
(Tex. 1938); Awtrey v. Norfolk & W.R. Co., 93 S.E. 570 (Va. 1917); Koer-
ber v. Patek, 102 N.W. 40 (1905).
154. See Farley, 8 Ohio Dec. Rep. at 119.
155. See e.g., Streipe v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 47 S.W.2d 1004 (Ky.
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body, 156 or unauthorized embalming procedures.157 While wrongful
autopsy and negligent handling of the body of a dead person generally
have been found sufficient to constitute mutilation, 58 unauthorized
embalming has not." 9
Whether a court is willing to recognize the tort of mutilation turns
on the end effect of the action upon the corpse. Two possible ques-
tions for the court include (1) whether the body is fit for an open cas-
ket burial and if so, (2) whether the actor invaded the body so as to
render it unfit for burial.
The RORP can be easily compared to the process of embalming for
purposes of evaluating whether the RORP process rises to the level of
mutilation. The goals for embalming are to disinfect, preserve, and re-
store the body. 60 Embalming requires the technician to make an inci-
sion in the clavicle and access the corotid artery and jugular vein. 161
The technician then inserts catheters and initiates the embalming ma-
chine, 62 which pumps formaldehyde into the corotid artery and drains
blood from the jugular vein, 163 until the extremities of the body b'e6
come hydrated with formaldehyde.
164
Ct. App. 1932). (Widow sued to recover damages for wrongful autopsy of
husband who did not die under suspicious circumstances.)
156. See e.g., Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates,
P.A., 395 S.E.2d 85, 105 (N.C. 1990).
157. See e.g., Parker v. Quinn-McGowen, Co., 138 S.E.2d 214 (N.C.
1964) (an unauthorized embalming of dead body, without more, did not con-
stitute mutilation of a body).
158. See e.g., Streipe v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 47 S.W.2d 1004 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1932); see also Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates,
P.A., 395 S.E.2d 85, 105 (N.C. 1990).
159. See id.
160. See Telephone Interview with Tim Smith, Demaine Funeral Home
(Nov. 20, 1998).
161. See id
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id The machine flushes through the carotid artery and jugular
vein until naturally occurring blood pools are no longer detectable. If blood
continues to pool, usually in the extremities, the technician will move to the
femoral arteries in the legs and the auxiliary and radial arteries in the arms to
effectuate hydration. Id.
20001
526 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 16:501
If conducted pursuant to the Organ Preservation Amendment, 165 the
RORP process is very similar to the embalming process. Due to the
similarity of procedure and intrusion into the decedent's body, it
would be difficult for the next of kin to prove that the RORP process
rises to the level of mutilation. 166 Thus far, embalming has not, when
performed properly, been found to rise to the level of tortious mutila-
tion. It is, therefore, unlikely that the RORP process would rise to
such a level.
B. The Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Many jurisdictions allow those suffering emotional anguish to re-
cover damages where one acts willfully, wantonly or maliciously and
thus injures a dead body. 167 The nature of the tort requires the injured
party to prove the tortfeasor acted purposefully and such actions
would reasonably result in the injured party suffering emotional an-
guish. 168
The RORP process necessitates a family claiming mental anguish-to
sue under the rubric of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
RORP involves the purposeful placement of preservation equipment
inside the body cavity of the decedent. 169 To prove the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, the injured must show that (1)
extreme and outrageous conduct occurred that, (2) intentionally or
165. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1509.1 (1998).
166. See e.g., Streipe v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 47 S.W.2d 1004 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1932); see also Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates,
P.A., 395 S.E.2d 85, 105 (N.C. 1990).
167. See generally, Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1983); Sherer
v. Rubin Mem'l Chapel, Ltd., 452 So.2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Bur-
gess v. Perfue, 721 P.2d 239 (Kan. 1986); Weingast v. State, 254 N.Y.S.2d
952 (N.Y. Ct. CI. 1946); Brownlee v. Pratt (Huron Co.), 68 N.E.2d 798 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1946); Nail v. McCullough & Lee, 212 P. 981 (1923); Papieves v.
Lawrence, 263 A.2d 118 (Penn. 1970); Hackett v. United Airlines, 528 A.2d
971 (Pa. Super. 1987); Awtrey v. Norfolk & W.R. Co., 93 S.E. 570 (Va.
1917); Kneass v. Cremation Soc. of Washington, 175 P. 172 (Wash. 1918).
168. See Dean v. Chapman, 556 P.2d 257 (Okla. 1976).
169. See Weiss, supra note 24, at AI6; see also Light, supra note 15, at
3553; A.E. Kowalski, supra note 18, at 656.
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recklessly caused, (3) severe emotional distress to another. 170
In order to prove the first element, the conduct must be "so outra-
geous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all pos-
sible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community."'' If a family member claimed
intentional infliction of emotional distress as a result of witnessing the
catheters and equipment used by the RORP team, it would be difficult
to show this rises to the level of egregious conduct required by the
first element. This is because District of Columbia residents are over-
whelmingly in favor of the RORP. 172 Though public opinion cannot
drive the reasonableness of conduct, it is relevant to the determination
of whether or not the act is, "so outrageous in character, and so ex-
treme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and
to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in [the] civilized
community."'
173
Therefore, it would behoove any hospital administrator to survey
and study the population within which it works. It is likely their find-
ings would be similar to the Council of the District of Columbia,
thereby providing one more element in defense of possible litigation.
C. Liability of the Hospital in a Tort Action
Washington Hospital Center utilizes the RORP pursuant to the Or-
gan Preservation Amendment. This statute specifically immunizes the
hospital from liability, "in the absence of gross negligence or willful
misconduct.' 74 Similarly, under the presumed consent statute in the
170. See Cooke-Seals v. District of Columbia et al., 973 F. Supp 184
(D.C. Dist. 1997).
171. See id. at 188.
172. See Council of the District of Columbia, supra note 4. William 0.
Ritchie, Jr., Ph.D., Director, Office of Decedent Affairs, Washington Hospi-
tal Center, testified in support of the legislation and noted that he made pres-
entations throughout the city to survey community response. He found
overwhelming support for the proposed Organ Preservation amendment to
the Anatomical Gift Act. See id. at 4-5.
173. Cooke-Seals v. District of Columbia, et al., 973 F. Supp 184, 188
(D.C.Dist. 1997).
174. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1509.1(d) (1998).
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District of Columbia, 175 if a person performing the procedure "acts in
good faith," he or she is not subject to any civil liability. 176 This im-
munity clause only protects against negligent action. The tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress is a specific intent action not
covered by this immunity clause.
The Organ Preservation Amendment immunity clause is a bit less
protective than the M.E. immunity clause. The Organ Preservation
immunity clause protects the hospital utilizing organ preservation
techniques specified in the statute from the tort of mutilation. While
the RORP process likely will not rise to the level of mutilation, even if
it did, the hospital would be immune from liability if it followed the
statutory provisions.
Though it is unlikely the RORP process could rise to the level of
atrocious and intolerable action, the hospital may be liable if it did.
This is because the immunity provision of the Organ Preservation
statute only immunizes the hospital from negligent action. The tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress results from, by definition,
grossly negligent or willful misconduct. Either tort action places a
tremendous burden upon the plaintiff.
IV. CONCLUSION
The RORP is essential to increasing the supply of available trans-
plant organs. The nature of the RORP process requires that the time of
death be called prior to implementation, thus triggering the end of the
decedent's personal constitutional rights. The next of kin's rights to
custody and decent burial of the decedent, though deserving of pro-
tection, do not rise to the level of procedural or substantive due proc-
ess evidencing a constitutional tort. Therefore, any remedy a family
seeks in reaction to unconsented RORP procedures would be through
tortious mutilation or intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Neither of these claims are likely to be successful given the nature
of the RORP process. The tort of mutilation requires the body of the
decedent to be unfit for burial. This standard requires severe intrusions
into the body cavity by hospital personnel. Such intrusions are not re-
quired by the RORP process. Therefore, if the RORP process is per-
formed per the Consensus Conference protocol and Washington Hos-
175. See id. at § 2-1605(c)(1).
176. Id. at § 2-1605(c)(6).
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pital Center procedures, mutilation will not occur. The tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress places an extremely high burden
on the plaintiff to prove the first element: the RORP process shocks
the conscience of those in the community. This standard is almost im-
possible to reach where the hospital can present evidence of a commu-
nity survey in majority support of the RORP.
Because a hospital faces little or no liability to the family of the de-
cedent in implementing the RORP process, without removing the or-
gans, each hospital in the nation has an obligation to the health and
care of patients in its geographical area to implement the RORP pro-
gram. It would be unjust to do otherwise.

